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ABSTRACT
Until 2017, the most recent disqualification of a member of the Australian 
Parliament under section 44(i) of the Australian Constitution (‘Constitution’) was 
Senator Heather Hill in 1998. Remarkably, since 2017, almost twenty years after 
Sue v Hill, ten parliamentarians have resigned or been disqualified, triggering a 
series of by-elections. 
The catalyst for this flurry of activity occurred in July 2017, when Greens 
senator Scott Ludlam announced that at the time of his election, he was a citizen 
of New Zealand and was incapable of sitting in parliament under section 44(i). He 
was the first of ten senators and members of Parliament to be referred to the High 
Court of Australia in the cases of Re Canavan and later Re Gallagher on questions 
of eligibility under section 44(i). Eight of these parliamentarians were disqualified, 
sparking national debate around parliamentary representation and membership 
within the Australian community. 
Since Re Canavan and Re Gallagher and indeed well before those cases, the 
section had and has continued to attract popular, journalistic, parliamentary and 
academic criticism. Consequently, there have been calls for a referendum on 
section 44(i) for a significant period of time. Whilst the authors support this call, 
this article reflects on the cases and develops a different interpretive approach to 
section 44(i) which if argued by the parties and adopted by the Court, would have 
rendered a referendum unnecessary. By drawing on the earlier section 41 of the 
Australian Constitution case of R v Pearson; Ex parte Sipka and its majority 
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(Honours Thesis, Monash University, 2018). Significant parts of this article draw from her 
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# Kim Rubenstein is a Professor in the Law School, ANU College of Law, Australian 
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judgment, as well as drawing upon the minority judgment of Murphy J and a more 
recent feminist judgment written by Kim Rubenstein, one of the authors of this 
article, we argue that the principles of representative democracy and the sovereignty 
of the people could have acted as a frame to read down section 44(i). Had this 
approach been adopted, the Court could have effectively placed the decision 
around disqualification of parliamentarians around the issue of dual citizenship, 
back into the hands of the elected representatives.
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MPs; nationality as parliamentary qualification; citizenship as parliamentary 
qualification; dual citizenship; R v Pearson; Ex parte Sipka; feminist jurisprudence; 
feminist judgments; feminism and Australian Constitution.
INTRODUCTION
Until 2017, the most recent disqualification of a member of the Australian 
Parliament under section 44(i) of the Australian Constitution (‘Constitution’) was 
Senator Heather Hill in 1998.1 Remarkably, since 2017, almost twenty years after 
Sue v Hill, ten parliamentarians have resigned or been disqualified, triggering a 
series of by-elections. 
The catalyst for this flurry of activity occurred in July 2017, when Greens 
senator Scott Ludlam announced that at the time of his election, he was a citizen 
of New Zealand and was incapable of sitting in parliament under section 44(i). He 
was the first of ten senators and members of Parliament to be referred to the High 
Court of Australia in the cases of Re Canavan2 and later Re Gallagher3 on 
questions of eligibility under section 44(i). Eight of these parliamentarians were 
disqualified, sparking national debate around parliamentary representation and 
membership within the Australian community. 
Section 44(i) is of paramount importance when thinking about representative 
democracy and citizenship in Australia. The section disqualifies from parliament 
any person who ‘is under any acknowledgement of allegiance, obedience, or 
adherence to a foreign power, or is a subject or a citizen or entitled to the rights or 
privileges of a subject or a citizen of a foreign power’.4 It therefore regulates who 
1 Sue v Hill [1999] 199 CLR 462; ‘Sue v Hill’, ABC Fact Check, ‘Fact file: The Dual 
Citizenship Crisis’ (ABC News) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-12-06/fact-file-the-
dual-citizenship-scandal/9147418> accessed 6 December 2017.
2 [2017] 91 ALJR 1209. 
3 [2018] 92 ALJR 502.
4 Australian Constitution, section 44(i). 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
81
can and cannot be elected to parliament and significantly impacts upon the nature 
of popular sovereignty and representative government. Whilst not every Australian 
will necessarily aspire to be a member of parliament, the capacity to run for public 
office can be understood as one of the ‘highest’ reflections of citizenship through 
representing fellow Australians in parliament and consequently, a reflection of a 
person’s fullest form of membership within the Australian community. By 
articulating clear prerequisites to sitting in parliament, section 44(i) sets a threshold 
requirement for nomination to be considered for election and represents current 
restrictions on active citizenship in Australia – limiting dual citizens to voting as 
the fullest form of civic participation. 
Since Re Canavan and Re Gallagher and indeed well before those cases, the 
section had and has continued to attract popular,5 journalistic,6 parliamentary7 
and academic criticism.8 Consequently, there have been calls for a referendum on 
5 See for example Arthur Marusevich, ‘The War Against Section 44 and How we Can Defeat 
it’ (Lawyers Weekly) <https://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/wig-chamber/23310-the-war-
against-section-44-and-how-we-can-defeat-it> accessed 28 May 2018; Rosie Lewis, 
‘By-election results strengthen calls to change section 44’, (The Australian) <https://www.
theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/byelection-results-strengthen-calls-to-change-
section-44/news-story/eaa5f35eedbe780e70186499c5cec0ff> accessed 3 August 2018.
6 See for example Joe McIntyre, ‘The Dual citizenship Saga Shows Our Constitution 
Must Be Changed, and Now’ (The Conversation 17 November 2017) <https://
theconversation.com/the-dual-citizenship-saga-shows-our-constitution-must-be-changed-
and-now-87330>; Paul Karp, ‘Referendum “the only way” to solve Australia’s citizenship 
crisis’ (The Guardian) <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/may/08/
referendum-the-only-way-to-solve-australias-citizenship-crisis> accessed 8 May 2018.
7 Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Dual Nationality, Report (1976) 8; 
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, National Consultation on Multiculturalism 
and Citizenship, Report (1982) 28; see Australia, Parliament, Joint Standing Committee 
on Migration, Australians All: Enhancing Australian Citizenship (1994) ch 6; see 
Australian Citizenship Council, Australian Citizenship for a New Century (February 
2000) 60–66; Australia, Parliament, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, Aspects of Section 44 of the Australian Constitution (July 1997). 
8 See for example Kim Rubenstein, From this time forward … I pledge my loyalty to 
Australia: loyalty, citizenship and constitutional law in Australia, ANU College of Law 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1130626> accessed 8 May 2018; 
Andrew Brown, ‘Referendum to Change Section 44 Should be Held at Election, Law 
Expert Says’ (The Sydney Morning Herald) <https://www.smh.com.au/national/act/
referendum-to-change-section-44-should-be-held-at-election-law-expert-says-20180307-
h0x5oe.html> accessed 10 March 2018.
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section 44(i) for a significant period of time.9 Whilst the authors support this call, 
this article reflects on the cases and develops a different interpretive approach to 
section 44(i) which, if argued by the parties and adopted by the Court, would have 
rendered a referendum unnecessary.10 By drawing on the earlier section 41 of the 
Australian Constitution case of R v Pearson; Ex parte Sipka11 and its majority 
judgment, as well as drawing upon the minority judgment of Murphy J and a more 
recent feminist judgment written by Kim Rubenstein, one of the authors of this 
article, we argue that the principles of representative democracy and the sovereignty 
of the people could have acted as a frame to read down section 44(i). Had this 
approach been adopted, the Court could have effectively placed the decision 
around disqualification of parliamentarians around the issue of dual citizenship, 
back into the hands of the elected representatives.
SECTION 44(i) AND CITIZENSHIP IN AUSTRALIA
Australian citizenship is not defined in the Constitution. Section 44(i) is the only 
part of the Constitution to refer to the word citizen, but not Australian citizens, 
rather citizens of a foreign power. Delegate John Quick argued to include a 
definition of citizenship in the Constitution to empower the Commonwealth 
to regulate citizenship and membership within the Australian community.12 
9 See for example Matthew Doran, ‘Will We Actually Vote on Changing the Constitution 
After the Dual Citizenship Fiasco?’ (ABC News) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-
17/section-44-committee-recommendations-after-citizenship-fiasco/9770606> accessed 
17 May 2018.
10 The authors resist the argument that only a referendum could have cured the 
constitutional crisis caused by section 44(i) for two reasons. First, the constitutional 
requirement that a referendum be supported by a majority of states, in addition to a 
majority of voters, adds a Federal hurdle effectively giving some states’ voters more power 
over what is otherwise a national issue and thereby compromises the principle of 
representative democracy. Second, only eight out of forty-four referendums have been 
successful since Federation. This highlights the difficulty of the process which should not 
be the preferred option for what is otherwise an interpretive ‘problem’ posed by section 
44(i) and undermines the constitutionally entrenched values of representative democracy 
and popular sovereignty. This article, however, highlights what could have been a different 
approach, although the decisions of Re Canavan and Re Gallagher have minimised this 
approach being adopted during this Court’s term.
11 [1983] 152 CLR 254.
12 Kim Rubenstein, ‘Citizenship and the Constitutional Convention Debates: A Mere 
Legal Inference’ (1997) 25(2) FLR 295.
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However, despite citizenship being discussed multiple times during the Convention 
Debates, Quick’s suggestion was rejected.13
As Rubenstein writes, although there were many reasons for Australian 
citizenship not to be included in the Constitution,14 there was agreement around 
section 44(i) which was intended to safeguard against treason by ‘prevent[ing] 
persons with foreign loyalties or obligations from being members of the Australian 
Parliament’.15 As Rubenstein explains:
The delegates were therefore content to disqualify people whose allegiance 
was to a foreign power because ‘[p]ersons who have taken the oath of allegiance 
to a foreign power are not to be classed in the same category as citizens of the 
country for the purpose of joining in legislation’. This led to an interjection 
‘And not to be trusted!’16
The framers’ presumption that dual nationality was ‘undesirable, incompatible 
with individual loyalties’17 reflects the international norms of the 18th and 19th centuries, 
‘characterised by aggressive nationalism and territorial competition’18 and the 
unresolved question of whether sole allegiance is central to Australian citizenship.19 
But what does allegiance mean in the 21st century compared to the 18th and 
19th centuries? When the ten parliamentarians were recently referred to the High 
Court, the Court was not encouraged by the parties to look at the question of the 
changed meaning of allegiance in Australia. Rather, the submissions led to the 
High Court of Australia determining that section 44(i) captures two categories of 
dual nationals.20 It includes people who are:
1. ‘under any acknowledgement of allegiance, obedience, or adherence to a 
foreign power’21 or
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid; Patrick Emerton, ‘Political Freedoms and Entitlements in the Australian 
Constitution: An Example of Referential Intentions Yielding Unintended Legal 
Consequences’ (2010) 38(2) FLR 169, 169. 
15 Sykes v Cleary [1992] 176 CLR 77, 127. 
16 Rubenstein (n 12) 302. 
17 Rubenstein (n 8) 24.
18 Ibid. See also Peter Spiro, ‘Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship’ (1997) 
46(4) ELJ 1411.
19 Rubenstein (n 12).
20 Re Canavan [2017] 91 ALJR 1209. 
21 Australian Constitution section 44(i).
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2. a ‘subject or a citizen or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or a 
citizen of a foreign power’.22
The first limb looks to the ‘conduct of the person concerned’.23 The second 
limb concerns the duties attached to one’s foreign citizenship (as determined by 
the foreign power), irrespective of the individual’s feelings of loyalty and 
allegiance.24 This distinction was key to Brennan J’s judgment in Sykes and was 
adopted by the Court in Re Canavan.
Justice Brennan’s approach in Sykes was supported by the majority. In contrast, 
Deane J dissented in Sykes on the grounds that as the former ‘involves an element 
of acceptance or at least acquiescence on the part of the relevant person’,25 the 
latter should also be constructed to impliedly contain a mental element; to only 
capture ‘cases where the relevant status, rights or privileges have been sought, 
accepted, asserted or acquiesced in by the person concerned’.26 Whilst Deane J’s 
approach underpinned some of the applicants’ submissions in Re Canavan these 
were unanimously rejected in favour of the majority decision in Sykes. 
Re Canavan and Re Gallagher
In Re Canavan, three submissions were put to the Court on behalf of those seeking 
to resist disqualification. First, representing Senators Canavan, Roberts and 
Xenophon, the Attorney General argued that section 44(i) was ‘said to import a 
requirement that the person know or be wilfully blind about his or her foreign 
citizenship’27 and should only be enlivened if foreign citizenship was voluntarily 
obtained or retained. Counsel for Joyce and Nash argued that the foreign citizenship 
must be actively chosen or maintained, as ‘a person cannot make a choice to retain 
or renounce any foreign citizenship if he or she has no knowledge of that 
citizenship’.28 Additionally, counsel for Ludlam and Waters submitted that 
22 Ibid.
23 Re Canavan [2017] 91 ALJR 1210. 
24 Martin Clark, ‘Re Canavan; Re Joyce; Re Ludlam; Re Nash; Re Roberts; Re Waters; 
Re Xenophon’ (Opinions on High) <https://blogs.unimelb.edu.au/opinionsonhigh/2017/ 
12/06/re-canavan-et-al-case-page/> accessed 6 December 2017.
25 Sykes [1992] 176 CLR 77, 127.
26 Ibid.
27 Re Canavan [2017] 91 ALJR 1214. In summarising the case for this article, the authors 
benefitted from the excellent summary in Clark (n 24) <http://blogs.unimelb.edu.au/
opinionsonhigh/2017/12/06/re-canavan-et-al-case-page/> accessed 20 November 2018.
28 Ibid.
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section 44(i) should only capture a candidate or member that is ‘put on notice’;29 
the candidate or member must have ‘had knowledge of the facts that, in the mind 
of a reasonable person taking a properly diligent approach to compliance with the 
Constitution, ought to call into question the belief that he or she is not a subject or 
citizen of a foreign power and prompt proper inquiries’.30 All three submissions 
argued for a narrow, non-originalist construction of the section which imports a 
knowledge requirement. 
In reaching its decision to reject these constructions of section 44(i), the Court 
was informed by several factors, placed before the Court in the arguments of Tony 
Windsor,31 challenging Mr Joyce’s membership of parliament and a Court-
appointed Amicus Curiae32 to assist the Court in hearing arguments against the 
applicants. 
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Some of the arguments made by counsel for Mr Windsor were reflected in the majority’s 
decision. First, Counsel described the Attorney-General as attempting to ‘resurrect’ Deane 
J’s dissent in Sykes, effectively calling on the Court to reopen a matter that had already been 
settled in subsequent cases, such as the High Court case of Sue v Hill, and referred to by the 
court in at least eleven other matters. Furthermore, Counsel outlined six similarities between 
Mr Joyce’s and Mr Kardamitsis’s circumstances, arguing that the former should therefore 
also be disqualified. This was reflected in Re Canavan when the Court’s strictly applied 
section 44(i) in accordance with the majority in Sykes and disqualified Mr Joyce. Second, the 
Court’s outright rejection of imputing a knowledge requirement is consistent with Counsel’s 
submission that the purpose of section 44(i) was to only disqualify people on the basis of 
objective, ascertainable fact, and not subjective vagaries. This is necessary to ensure certainty 
of the electoral process to ensure candidates know whether they can run for election and 
electors know who they are able to vote for. Counsel grounded this submission in the drafting 
history of the text. This was also reflected in the majority’s reasoning which drew heavily on 
the different drafts of section 44(i) considered by the framers during the Constitutional 
Debates. Third, Counsel submitted that disqualification under section 44(i) is based on the 
laws of the foreign power in question. This is consistent with the Court’s finding in Re 
Canavan. See Mr Antony Harold Curties Windsor, ‘In the matter of questions referred to the 
Court of Disputed Returns pursuant to section 376 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 
(Cth) concerning the Hon. Barnaby Joyce MPs submission in Re Canavan, No. C15 of 2017, 
[11], [13], [15], [17], [37], [39] <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/cases/03-Canberra/c11-2017/
Joyce_WindsorSubs.pdf> accessed 3 October 2017.
32 Amici Curiae, ‘Re Senator the Hon Matthew Canavan, Re Senator the Hon Fiona Nash, 
Re Senator Nick Xenophon, References under section 376 of the Commonwealth Electoral 
Act 1918 (Cth)’ Submission in Re Cananvan, No. C11 of 2017, No. C17 of 2017, No. C18 of 
2017 <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/cases/03-Canberra/c11-2017/Canavan_
KennettSubs.pdf> accessed 20 November 2018.
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First, the Court considered the drafting history as not supportive of a narrow, 
non-originalist construction of the section. Between 1891 and 1899, different 
drafts of section 44(i) were considered by the constitutional framers. However, as 
the clauses ‘remained in substantially identical form’,33 the differences between 
the different drafts could not ‘be attributed to any articulated difference in the 
mischief’,34 namely that disqualification was intended to focus on the specific acts 
of the parliamentarian in becoming a subject, or becoming entitled to the rights of 
a subject or citizen of a foreign power. 
Secondly, the Court held that determination of a parliamentarian’s status as a 
subject or citizen of a foreign power exclusively depends on the citizenship laws of 
the foreign power in question. Importantly, the Court outlined two notable 
exceptions to this rule – where the disqualification would undermine the 
constitutional principles of representative and responsible government35 and where 
a parliamentarian has made a reasonable effort to comply with the section.
A parliamentarian will have made a reasonable effort to comply if they take 
reasonable steps to divest themselves of the rights or privileges of a citizen of a 
foreign power. This will depend on the ‘situation of the individual, the requirements 
of the foreign law and the extent of the connexion between the individual and the 
foreign State’.36 
The Court then expanded on what this means in Re Gallagher. The 
constitutional imperative of divestment under section 44(i) will be satisfied if the 
‘foreign law operates irremediably to prevent an Australian citizen from 
participation’37 and the citizen has taken all steps reasonably required under the 
foreign law that ‘are within his or her power to free himself or herself of the 
foreign nationality’.38 A foreign law is considered to irremediably prevent 
divestment if it presents an ‘insurmountable obstacle’39 such as requiring a dual 
citizen to explicitly renounce their citizenship in the territory of the foreign 
power and put themselves at risk. 
33 Re Canavan [2017] 91 ALJR 1210, 1217.
34 Ibid.
35 In separate judgments in Sykes, Brennan and Deane JJ argued that an originalist 
construction of section 44(i) could lead to consequences unintended by the framers. If 
section 44(i) is subject to foreign citizenship laws, a foreign power could disqualify all 
parliamentarians by conferring citizenship on them, thereby triggering the section and 
stimulating a constitutional crisis. See Sykes [1992] 176 CLR 77, 113, 126–27.
36 Ibid 108.
37 Re Gallagher [2018] 92 ALJR 502, 508.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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Finally, the Court held that recognising a knowledge requirement in section 
44(i) would pose ‘conceptual difficulties’.40 It would be difficult to ascertain the 
level of knowledge a parliamentarian would require to enliven section 44(i), as 
this could range from the ‘faintest inkling’41 through to ‘absolute certainty..42 
In turn, application of section 44(i) would turn on the ‘unstable distinction 
between overt voluntary acts and conscious omissions’43 and would require the 
impossible task of inquiring into the parliamentarian’s state of mind at the time 
of nomination. 
Whilst these arguments show consistency regarding the Court’s approach 
from Sykes onwards, we argue there could have been a different approach placed 
before the Court to interpreting section 44(i). By considering the democratic 
context of section 44(i) within the Constitution and the democratic constituency 
that Australia has evolved to include, we argue that the Court could have been 
encouraged to look at another provision, section 41 of the Constitution, to assist in 
reading down the section, and to reconsider the meaning of allegiance in the 
21st century. 
Section 41 deals with a significant aspect of representative democracy – the 
‘right to vote’. It states:
No adult person who has or acquires a right to vote at elections for the more 
numerous House of the Parliament of a State shall, while the right continues, 
be prevented by any law of the Commonwealth from voting at elections for 
either House of the Parliament of the Commonwealth.44 
This section is another example of active citizenship provided for in the 
Constitution. Indeed, one needs to be eligible to vote before one can be eligible to 
be represented in parliament. Since section 41 and 44(i) both provide for active 
civic engagement – through voting and through being a representative of the voters – 
arguments raised in relation to construction of the former could have informed 
construction of the latter and could have been argued by the relevant parties 
resisting disqualification in Re Canavan. 
40 Re Canavan [2017] 91 ALJR 1221.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Australian Constitution section 41.
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MAJORITY DECISION IN SIPKA
On 3 February 1983, then Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser called a snap election 
and closed the electoral rolls early, preventing thousands of eligible voters from 
enrolling to vote.45 This was used as a test case by the applicants to explore the 
parameters of section 41. The applicants argued that by closing the rolls early, 
eligible voters under the state franchise of New South Wales (‘NSW’) were 
deprived of their right to vote, in contravention of section 41. 
The scope of section 41 was explored by both the judgments of the majority in 
Sipka, as well as the minority and aspects later identified as relevant to the minority 
decision. This article considers the two judgments separately and outlines parallel 
arguments that could have been made by the parties in relation to section 44(i). 
All judges in Sipka referred to historical considerations to deliver interpretations 
of section 41.
The majority46 read down section 41 as serving only a temporary purpose: to 
preserve ‘only those rights which were in existence before the passing of the 
Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902’.47 Limiting section 41 preserved the uniform 
commonwealth franchise ‘over whatever advantage might have accrued to 
individual voters had the section been given a continuing operation’.48 
This decision is still considered controversial as it rendered section 41 
obsolete.49 However, as the decision is yet to be reversed, it serves as a practical 
illustration of a court referring to historical considerations when engaging in 
constitutional construction50 and where necessary, reading down a provision 
45 See the description of the context of the case coming before the High Court in Elisa 
Arcioni and Kim Rubenstein, ‘R v Pearson; Ex Parte Sipka: Feminism and the Franchise’ 
in Heather Douglas and others (eds), Australian Feminist Judgments: Writing and 
Rewriting Law (Hart Publishing 2014) 55.
46 Gibbs CJ, Mason and Wilson JJ delivered one joint judgment; and Brennan, Dawson 
and Deane JJ delivered a second joint judgment.
47 Sipka [1983] 152 CLR 254, 264.
48 Cheryl Saunders, The Constitution of Australia (Hart Publishing 2011) 142.
49 For a detailed critical analysis, see Anne Twomey, ‘The Federal Constitutional Right to Vote 
in Australia’ (2000) 28(1) FLR 125; Peter Hanks, Constitutional Law in Australia (Butterworths 
2nd ed 1996); Adrian Brooks, ‘A Paragon of Democratic Virtues? The Development of the 
Commonwealth Franchise’ (1993) 12(2) University of Tasmania Law Review 208.
50 Jonathan Crowe and Peta Stephenson agree with Murphy J and dispute whether the 
history of section 41 supports the majority’s finding that the section was intended as 
transitional. However, since they consider Murphy J’s judgment persuasive and do not 
object to his methodology of permitting history to inform constitutional construction, 
their argument does not contradict the insight drawn from Sipka by this article. See 
Jonathan Crowe and Peta Stephenson, ‘An Express Constitutional Right to Vote? The 
Case for Reviving Section 41’ (2014) 36(2) Sydney Law Review 205.
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where the social context of the section has changed so significantly to render the 
provision obsolete. 
The most methodologically significant consideration of the majority was the 
drafting history of section 41.51 They held it revealed the ‘apprehended mischief’52 
as protecting the women of South Australia until their rights to vote were enshrined 
in the federal franchise. 
After women were granted the right to vote in South Australia in 1895 and 
Western Australia in 1899, South Australia threatened to boycott Federation53 
unless a constitutional franchise included women.54 The delegates from other 
colonies opposed this. To ensure unity and defer discussions to a future parliament, 
the delegates agreed on section 41 as a compromise.55 It guaranteed the right to 
vote to anyone who had the right at the state level at the time of Federation, thereby 
including the women of South Australia.56 Informed by this background history, 
the majority recognised section 41 as transitional and as of 1902, when the 
Commonwealth Parliament had already legislated the universal franchise,57 
serving no further purpose. 
Importantly, this decision serves as precedent for reading down constitutional 
text to honour the constitutional history of the text in question. Where the history 
suggests that the framers drafted the text to meet a specific purpose, and that 
purpose no longer exists, the text in question can be rendered obsolete. 
This approach is relevant to section 44(i). Developments in Australian 
citizenship legislation reveal a change in the meaning of membership within the 
51 For the sake of completeness, the majority outlined two other reasons which are not 
directly relevant to this article. First, sections 8 and 30 of the Constitution confer the 
federal franchise on state electors ‘until the Parliament otherwise provides’. Thus, 
interpreting the Constitution holistically, section 41 was only intended to protect a state-
voter’s right to vote until the national franchise was established by Parliament in 1902. 
Second, if section 41 was to establish a constitutional federal franchise (as argued by the 
applicants), the uniform franchise could be amended by the laws of any state. This would 
render redundant section 128 of the Constitution which permits constitutional amendments 
only by referendum and would destroy the Parliament’s power to legislate regarding the 
uniform franchise. See Sipka [1983] 152 CLR 254, 277–79. 
52 Sipka [1983] 152 CLR 254, 262. 
53 This article adopts the capitalisation of the word ‘Federation’ in this section to be 
consistent with the Court’s judgment in Sipka. 
54 Arcioni and Rubenstein (n 45). 
55 Ibid.
56 Sipka [1983] 152 CLR 254.
57 Franchise Act 1902 (Cth) (‘Franchise Act’). Note the Franchise Act did not enfranchise 
indigenous women, as discussed also in Arcioni and Rubenstein (n 45).
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Australian citizenship community. Since 1901, when section 44(i) was drafted, 
Australian citizenship law has grown increasingly tolerant of multiculturalism and 
dual nationality. Most significantly, dual citizenship was fully embraced 
legislatively in 2002 with the repeal of then section 17 of the Australian Citizenship 
Act58 that had earlier mandated loss of Australian citizenship on the taking up of 
a new citizenship.59 We argue that the purpose for which section 44(i) was drafted 
no longer exists and similar to section 41, could have been argued to be redundant. 
Until 1949, a ‘British subject’ was the formal status of a full member of the 
Australian community. After the Australian Citizenship Act60 came into effect, 
citizenship encompassed both Australian citizens and British subjects.61 This 
remained the case until 1987 when full membership of the Australian community 
was conferred on Australian citizens alone.62 Since between 1949 and 1987, the 
term ‘Australian’ applied to both Australian citizens and British subjects; this 
suggests that ‘loyalty and allegiance in Australia … [could] cope with varying 
forms of identity and membership’.63
Furthermore, for many decades there was debate about whether section 17 of 
the Citizenship Act, which automatically stripped an Australian of their citizenship 
if they took up citizenship of another country, should be repealed. Already at the 
1976 Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence and the 1982 national 
consultations regarding multiculturalism and citizenship, section 17 was critically 
reviewed64 for three reasons. First, it was inconsistent as it only stripped some 
Australians of their citizenship, depending on the order in which the citizenships 
were obtained.65 For example, if a Swiss citizen moved to Australia and satisfied 
the requirements to obtain Australian citizenship, section 17 would not require 
58 2007 (Cth) (‘Citizenship Act’).
59 For a fuller explanation of the story of dual citizenship in Australia, see Kim Rubenstein 
and Jacqueline Field, ‘Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth)’ in Australian Citizenship 
Law (Thomson Reuters, 2nd edn, 2017) 91.
60 1948 (Cth).
61 Rubenstein (n 8).
62 Ibid. After 1987, British subjects lost their privileged status under Australian citizenship 
law unless they obtained Australian citizenship. However, British subjects listed on the 
Commonwealth electoral roll were entitled to remain under section 93(1) of the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth). See Rubenstein and Field (n 59). 
63 Kim Rubenstein, ‘Loyalty and Membership: Globalization and its Impact on 
Citizenship, Multiculturalism, and the Australian Community’ in Geoffrey Braham Levey 
(ed), Political Theory and Australian Multiculturalism (Berghahn Books 2008) 171, 176.
64 Rubenstein (n 8).
65 Ibid.
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them to give up their Swiss citizenship;66 whereas an Australian who moved to 
Switzerland and obtained Swiss citizenship would lose their Australian citizenship 
automatically.67 Second, in the increasingly globalised world, it was deemed 
‘anachronistic that one section of the Australian population should be disadvantaged 
by a prohibition on accessing more than one citizenship’.68 Finally, the Australian 
Citizenship Council suggested that a connection to an additional country does not 
detract from one’s connection to their birth country. As explained by the Council:
The law and practice of most countries with which Australia likes to compare 
itself permits citizens of those countries to obtain another citizenship without 
losing their original citizenship … These countries simply recognize that they 
have an internationally mobile population and that they can retain connection 
with this population even if another citizenship is acquired.69
Castan even considered the section unconstitutional. Excluding dual nationals 
from the ‘people of the Commonwealth’, even if they do not intend to cease 
membership within the Australian citizenship community, undermines the 
intended meaning of that constitutional term.70 
By 4 April 2002, the section was repealed. This repeal meant that from that 
date, the concept of not allowing and not ‘trusting’ within Australia, people with a 
‘foreign’ citizenship, was no longer relevant to any aspect of Australian citizenship 
legislation. All Australians could be dual citizens, no matter which way they 
became a dual citizen. In our view, this was a significant legislative step in relation 
to the interpretation of section 44(i).
Indeed, this legislative history reveals two further parallels between sections 41 
and 44(i) which justify applying the majority’s constitutional methodology in 
Sipka to section 44(i). First, it is uncontroversial that sections 44 and 45 of the 
Constitution were intended to disqualify from parliament any person whose 
loyalty and judgment could be questioned because of other obligations or 
responsibilities they may have.71 In fact, this was clarified during the Convention 
Debates when the framers interrupted the Debates to refer to dual citizens as 
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Rubenstein (n 8) 31. 
69 Rubenstein and Field (n 59) 272, quoting Australian Citizenship Council, above (n 7) 
65. 
70 Ibid.
71 n 15 and the accompanying text. 
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untrustworthy.72 Therefore, just as section 41 was intended to protect female 
voting rights federally, section 44(i) was intended to protect the Parliament from 
people considered disloyal or untrustworthy. 
Yet, Australian citizenship law now accepts and embraces dual nationality. 
This directly contradicts the current, strict construction of section 44(i) and 
suggests that the apprehended purpose of the section is now redundant. 
Second, reading down section 44(i) responds to a legislative shift, similar to 
section 41. In deciding to read down section 41, the majority was influenced by the 
Franchise Act. Once parliament enfranchised women in 1902 as part of the universal 
franchise, section 41 was no longer necessary and could be read down. Similarly, the 
repeal of section 17 of the Citizenship Act has signified a profound legislative shift 
in the understanding of citizenship and membership in Australia, allowing and 
affirming dual citizenship, such that section 44(i) should be read down. 
Moreover, the Court’s decision in Sue v Hill further justifies applying the 
constitutional methodology of reading the text down. In Sue v Hill, the Court considered 
whether Heather Hill, a dual citizen of the United Kingdom (‘UK’) and Australia, was 
disqualified from sitting as a senator under section 44(i). Although at Federation all 
Australians were considered British subjects, the Court disqualified Hill on the grounds 
the term ‘foreign power’ in section 44(i) had evolved to include the UK. The Court held 
‘some words and phrases are capable of applying to different persons or things at 
different times’.73 As explained in Roach v Electoral Commissioner:74
In 1901, the words ‘foreign power’ in s[ection] 44(i) did not include the United 
Kingdom, yet in Sue v Hill this Court held that, by reason of changes in 
Australia’s relations with the United Kingdom and in national and international 
circumstances over the intervening period, they had come to include the 
United Kingdom. The meaning of the words ‘foreign power’ did not change, 
but the facts relevant to the identification of the United Kingdom as being 
included in or excluded from that meaning had changed.75
In finding the two countries to be separate legal entities, the Court reflected on 
historical changes in the legal and political relationship between the UK and 
Australia. The passage of the Australia Act76 was evidence of this. Australian 
courts were not ‘bound to recognise and give effect … [to] the institutions of 
72 n 16. 
73 Sue v Hill [1999] 199 CLR 462, 526 [167]. 
74 [2007] 233 CLR 162. 
75 Ibid 173–74, [6].
76 1986 (Cth) (‘Australia Act’). 
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government of the United Kingdom’,77 the UK could no longer pass legislation to 
bind Australia,78 nor could the Privy Council hear any appeals from the Court.79 
Therefore, when section 44(i) was drafted, it was inconceivable that the framers 
intended the term ‘foreign power’ to capture the UK. Indeed, during the Convention 
Debates it was considered ‘simply monstrous that those who were born in England 
should in any way be subjected to the slightest disabilities’.80 However, at least by 1999, 
when Sue v Hill was decided, Australian citizenship excluded British subjects. 
This was consistent with the decision in Nolan v Minister for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs81 when the Court considered the meaning of the word ‘alien’ in section 
12 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). In Nolan, the Court conceded that the framers 
could not have conceived of British subjects as aliens. However, as Australia had 
gained legislative and cultural independence from the UK throughout the 20th century, 
Australian citizenship had developed to be independent of British citizenship.
Therefore, developments in Australian citizenship law suggest that membership 
within the Australian citizenship community has changed profoundly since 1901. 
Moreover, both Sue v Hill and Nolan prove that the frame of reference of 
section 44(i) – the term ‘foreign power’ – has died. Hence, similar to section 41, 
the intended mischief of section 44(i) is no longer operative and the section could 
have been read down. 
MINORITY DECISION IN SIPKA
Justice Murphy’s dissent in Sipka interpreted section 41 broadly and critically, was 
also informed by the drafting history and social context of the section.82 Justice 
Murphy noted that when the precursor to section 41 was discussed at the 
77 Sue v Hill [1999] 199 CLR 462, 490 [59].
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Record of the Debates of the Convention (Melb 1989) vol V, 1760. 
81 [1988] 165 CLR 178. 
82 Although not directly relevant to this article, it should be noted that Murphy J also 
considered policy ramifications in his decision. If section 41 is not broadly applied to 
guarantee the right to vote, future parliaments could target certain classes of citizens by 
excluding them from the federal franchise. Until its removal in 1962, section 4 of the 
Franchise Act disqualified Indigenous Australians from the Federal franchise, even 
though they could vote in state elections in NSW, Victoria and Tasmania. If section 41 was 
not intended to be interpreted broadly, the voting rights of Indigenous Australians in these 
states would have remained unprotected until 1962. This could have set a dangerous 
precedent, allowing future parliaments to deprive different classes of citizens of their 
Commonwealth right to vote. See Sipka [1983] 152 CLR 254, 270–71. 
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Convention Debates, Sir Edmund Barton feared the section would empower state 
legislatures to extend the franchise by enfranchising people at the state level.83 
Responding to these fears, Sir Isaac Isaacs proposed an altered version of 
section 41.84 The 1901 version of section 41 omitted Isaacs’s alterations, suggesting 
that Barton’s fears would still stand and that a broader reading of section 41, as 
argued by the applicants, still applies.85 
However, unlike the majority, Murphy J extended his historical analysis beyond 
the drafting history, to the history of the universal federal franchise in Australia. 
Justice Murphy reasoned that since Indigenous Australians were still excluded 
from the federal franchise until 1962, section 41 had to be interpreted broadly to 
guarantee the voting rights of the Indigenous population already exercising this 
right at the state level.86 Therefore, although Murphy J’s construction of section 41 
accounted for its drafting history, he diverged from the majority methodologically 
by analysing the broader history of the federal franchise.87
Rubenstein – one of the current authors – offered an alternate feminist 
judgment of Sipka developed as part of a larger Feminist Judgments Project.88 
Rubenstein interprets section 41 broadly as guaranteeing a fair voting system in 
Australia and preserving representative government. This is driven by an in-depth 
analysis of the personalities and social movements that impacted the drafting of 
section 41 and like Murphy J, goes beyond the discussions of the Convention 
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Although not directly relevant to this article, Murphy J outlined three additional 
reasons. First, the plain words of the section, which guarantee every adult voter in state 
elections the right to vote in federal elections, reveal the section’s purpose and favour a 
broad construction. Secondly, by purposefully omitting the limiting phrase used in other 
parts of the Constitution, ‘until the Parliament otherwise provides,’ the framers implied 
that section 41’s application should not be limited as transitional. See for example 
Australian Constitution section 30. Finally, although merely persuasive, Murphy J 
considered it noteworthy that Parliament has continued to refer to section 41 as 
guaranteeing the right to vote in legislation. See for example Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) 
section 39. See Sipka (1983) 152 CLR 254, 268–69, 273–74. 
88 The Australian Feminist Judgments Project brings together feminist lawyers, academics 
and activists to write alternative feminist judgments to a series of cases. The Project seeks 
to explore the opportunities and limitations of applying a feminist approach to legal 
decision-making in Australia. See TC Beirne School of Law, Australian Feminist 
Judgments Project, the University of Queensland <https://law.uq.edu.au/the-australian-
feminist-judgments-project> accessed 20 November 2018.
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Debates. Rubenstein focuses on the suffrage movement of South Australia and 
Western Australia and their work in bringing section 41 into fruition. Led by 
Catherine Helen Spence, these movements ‘impress[ed] upon their representatives 
that they would not vote in favour of Federation if their vote was not protected’.89 
They lobbied to secure section 41 as a guarantee of the fairest possible voting 
system in Australia. According to Rubenstein, this history highlights the mischief 
of section 41 as establishing a constitutional guarantee of a fair and democratic 
right to vote in Australia. Thus, any attempts to limit that guarantee by closing the 
electoral rolls early is a direct contravention of section 41. 
Methodologically, this approach is more like Murphy J’s dissent than the 
majority’s judgment. Instead of relying purely on the Convention Debates and 
drafting history, Rubenstein’s judgment is informed by the aspirations for section 
41 of individuals, like Spence, who influenced the drafting of the section but were 
not themselves framers. 
This constitutional methodology could be applied to section 44(i) in two ways. 
First, just as Murphy J and Rubenstein’s understanding of section 41 was 
informed by the broader history of the Australian franchise, the Court’s application 
of section 44(i) could account for cultural developments in Australia, specifically 
in relation to immigration. Australia’s immigration history reveals the nation’s 
transition from a people fearful of difference to accepting of multiculturalism and 
dual citizenship.90 
The attempt to root out dual nationality in Australia was fuelled by the widely 
held belief that nation-states must be organised along racially homogenous lines as 
‘any loosening of racial restrictions was seen as inviting inevitable civic and political 
discord’.91 This was best manifest in the White Australia policy which gave 
legislative credence to Australians’ belief that ‘[b]oth the indigenous Australians and 
the populous Asian countries of the region [were] threatening, [and] racially-defined 
[as] others against whom the new white settlers defined their identity and interests’.92 
This too was reflected in multilateral attempts to root out dual nationality. 
Underpinning a range of international measures and processes, including The Hague 
Convention and The Report of the ILC on Multiple Nationality, was the presumption 
that holding multiple allegiances was undesirable and should be avoided.93 
89 Arcioni and Rubenstein (n 45) 65. 
90 Noa Bloch, The Case for a Non-Originalist Construction of Section 44(i) of the 
Constitution (Honours Thesis, Monash University 2018) 20–26. 
91 Judith Brett, Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class: From Alfred Deakin to 
John Howard (Cambridge University Press 2003) 126.
92 Ibid 45.
93 Rubenstein (n 8); see Spiro (n 18). 
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However, at least by the 1960s, the White Australian policy was officially 
dismantled. Whilst it is disputed whether it was Holt or Whitlam who officially 
reversed the White Australia policy, the practical end was facilitated by the Fraser 
Government which made several multiculturalism achievements,94 including 
transforming the idea of multiculturalism into an immigration policy framework.95 
Furthermore, by the 1990s, immigration was perceived as ‘“good” for everybody – 
gastronomically, culturally and politically’.96 With 52 per cent of Australians ‘in 
support of the current immigration level or in support of an increased intake’,97 
Australia is today considered one of the most receptive Western countries to 
immigration.98
Therefore, the originalist application of section 44(i) applied in Re Canavan 
reflects Australians’ pre-1960s fear of cultural diversity and dual allegiance. 
Instead, construction of section 44(i) should account for a broader analysis of 
multiculturalism and immigration history in Australia. 
Second, similar to section 41, the democratic principles of popular sovereignty 
and representative government underpin section 44(i) and could inform its 
construction. 
A body of case law has grown which affirms the constitutionally enshrined 
principle of representative government:99 
That the Constitution intended to provide for the institutions of representative 
and responsible government is made clear both by the Convention Debates and 
by the terms of the Constitution itself.100
94 Brett attributes the policy shift to Whitlam, see Brett (n 88). The National Museum of 
Australia attributes the dismantling of White Australia to Holt. See National Museum of 
Australia, ‘White Australia Policy Ends’ <http://www.nma.gov.au/online_features/
defining_moments/featured/end_of_the_white_australia_policy> accessed 20 November 
2018. Markus argues that the policy shift was put into practice by Fraser and therefore 
attributes the policy shift to him, see Andrew Markus, Race: John Howard and the 
remaking of Australia (Allen & Unwin 2001). 
95 Brett (n 91). 
96 Ibid 98.
97 Andrew Markus, ‘Attitudes to Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Australia’ (2014) 
50(1) Journal of Sociology 10, 10.
98 Ibid.
99 Australian Capital Television (1992) 177 CLR 106; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills 
[1992] 177 CLR 1; Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1997] 189 CLR 520.
100 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 557.
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Sections 7 and 24 of the Constitution stipulate that members of the House of 
Representatives and Senate shall be directly chosen by the people at periodic 
elections. The requirement to ‘effectuate the free election of representatives at 
periodic elections’101 was the basis of the Court’s provision of representative 
government within the Constitution in Lange. The Court found that ‘[s]ections 1, 
7, 8, 13, 24, 25, 28 and 30 of the Constitution give effect to the purpose of self-
government by providing for the fundamental features of representative 
government’.102
Courts have acknowledged popular sovereignty within the Constitution by 
recognising several modes of civic engagement as constitutionally protected. This 
includes the right to political communication,103 speech,104 voting,105 political 
funding106 and access for political activity.107 
Courts will give effect to the implied freedom to engage civically108 by 
recognising the protections necessary to ensure the political sovereignty of the 
people.109 This was illustrated in Roach when the Court struck down legislation 
which sought to extinguish prisoners’ right to vote and their membership in the 
body politic. 
Furthermore, Keane J argues that the Commonwealth enfranchisement of the 
people, as stipulated in sections 7 and 24, establishes ‘that the people of the 
Commonwealth are the sovereign power’.110 Unlike the United States Constitution 
which protects the rights of the individual, the Constitution frames the freedoms 
of civic engagement and responsible government in ‘collectivist and egalitarian’111 
terms; it serves the aggregate interests of the Australian people by guaranteeing 
‘[e]quality of opportunity to participate in the exercise of political sovereignty 
[which] is an aspect of the representative democracy’.112
If political unity is implicit within the principles of responsible government 
and popular sovereignty, any organ of government should be denied the power ‘to 
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Levy v Victoria [1997] 189 CLR 579. 
105 Roach (2007) 233 CLR 162; Rowe v Electoral Commissioner [2010] 243 CLR 1. 
106 Unions NSW v New South Wales [2013] 252 CLR 530. 
107 Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide [2013] 249 CLR 1. 
108 Unions [2013] 252 CLR 530. 
109 Ibid.
110 Patrick Keane, ‘The People and the Constitution’ (2016) 42(3) Monash University Law 
Review 529, 538.
111 Ibid 539.
112 McCloy v New South Wales [2015] 257 CLR 178, 207 [45].
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divide or segregate the people in terms of religion, race, gender or social 
condition’.113 Yet, section 44(i) ‘effectively create[s] two types of Australian 
citizens: those who can participate fully, and those who cannot’.114 The very 
premise of the section, which is to divide the population, is at odds with the 
implied constitutional freedoms the courts have recognised.115
In Re Canavan, the Court stressed that no disqualification under section 44(i) 
could undermine the constitutional principles of representative and responsible 
government.116 And yet, section 44(i) directly undermines the constitutionally 
enshrined principles of popular sovereignty and representative government. 
Therefore, applying the methodology of Murphy J and Rubenstein, the parties 
could have argued for an alternate construction of section 44(i) which is consistent 
with these constitutional principles. 
CONCLUSION
Irrespective of whether one follows the methodology of the majority or minority 
decisions from Sipka, this article has explained how the Sipka judgments could 
have guided the Court to read down section 44(i) so that it was no longer operative. 
This would then have meant that the Parliament would have been responsible for 
drafting disqualification provisions, if it so desired, around dual citizenship, 
through the Electoral Act. This approach would have been democratically 
motivated; it would have enabled Parliament to determine legislatively what it 
means to be a full member of the Australian citizenship community, cognisant of 
developments in Australian citizenship law and multiculturalism. Furthermore, as 
this determination would be formulated by democratically elected representatives, 
it is more consistent with the constitutional principles of representative government 
and popular sovereignty. 
113 Keane (n 110) 539.
114 Helen Irving, ‘Citizens and Not-quite Citizens’ (1993) 2(4) Constitutional Centenary: 
The Newsletter of the Constitutional Centenary Foundation 8, 10. 
115 For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that other commentators have 
considered section 44(i) as undermining different democratic, constitutional freedoms 
(and not just representative government and popular sovereignty). Jeremy Kirk argued that 
it undermines the freedom to nominate for elections. See Jeremy Kirk, ‘Constitutional 
Implications from Representative Democracy’ (1995) 23(1) FLR 37. Peter Bailey argued 
that it undermines the democratic right to be elected. See Peter Bailey, Human Rights: 
Australia in an International Context (Butterworths 1990). Helen Irving argued that it 
contradicts multiculturalism and undermines the principle of equality by creating two 
subclasses of citizens. See Irving (n 114).
116 See (n 35) and the accompanying text. 
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In arguing this, we should note that in seeking to update the Electoral Act, the 
Parliament would also be restrained by the constitutional principles outlined in 
this article that could have lead to the reading down of section 44(i). For example, 
it would be at odds with popular sovereignty to include in the Electoral Act a 
section which automatically disqualifies a person with blue eyes. Yet, it would still 
be open to the Parliament to identify methods of identifying ‘split allegiances’ or 
including provisions in the Electoral Act for automatically disqualifying someone 
where a direct conflict arises between Australia and the country of their second 
citizenship, such as being a citizen of a country at war with Australia, with a 
requirement at that time for renunciation of that citizenship in order to continue to 
be a member of Parliament.
Finally, it is worth noting that the electorate’s lack of concern over dual 
nationality was reinforced recently when all dual nationals forced to recontest 
their seats in the 2018 by-elections were returned.117 To some extent this also 
affirms how the Australian community has undergone a developmental process 
since 1901 and the concept of a single allegiance does not reflect Australians’ life 
experiences. This does not mean that earlier cases, such as Sykes, were wrongly 
decided. Rather, the national understanding of membership has shifted; dual 
citizenship is no longer viewed as less attractive by the voting public, and this is 
consistent with the legislative changes around dual citizenship in Australia, 
suggesting that section 44(i) is no longer necessary. For those members of the 
public still fearful of a dual citizen who is standing for Parliament, they would 
continue to have the opportunity to choose not to vote for that person as their 
representative, which is a more democratic way of managing those concerns. 
Fundamentally however, the changes in Australia’s citizenship legislation, 
together with the actual changes in the composition of Australian society, were 
both avenues for the Court, to read down section 44(i) of the Constitution. This 
would have simply solved the constitutional hurdles that now continue to prevent 
Australia’s dual citizens from exercising their active citizenship in the fullest sense 
of the word.
117 Stephen Donoghue, ‘The Collision of History and Text: The Story of Dual Citizens 
and section 44(i) of the Constitution’ (Speech delivered at the 2018 Melbourne University 
Law Students’ Society Sir Anthony Mason Lecture, Melbourne, 1 August 2018).
